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Abstract 
 
This study seeks to determine the extent to which countries of the former Soviet Union are 
“infected” by the Dutch Disease. We take a detailed look at the functioning of the 
transmission mechanism of the Dutch Disease, i.e. the chains that run from commodity 
prices to real output in manufacturing. We complement this with two econometric exercises. 
First, we estimate nominal and real exchange rate models to see whether commodity prices 
are correlated with the exchange rate. Second, we run growth equations to analyse the 
possible effects of commodity prices and the dependency of economic growth on natural 
resources.  
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1. Introduction1
 
Despite an abundance of, mainly empirical, papers aimed at establishing the extent 
to which a country’s natural resources affects its potential long-term economic growth, there 
is no wide consensus that countries whose economic structures depend on natural 
resources are necessarily penalised in the long run with in terms of economic growth. 
The seminal paper of Sachs and Werner (1995) and some follow-up research 
(Collier and Godenis, 2007) argue that the Dutch-Disease effect is a matter of concern for 
emerging economies in Asia and Sub-Saharian Africa. However, a number of other research 
papers question the generality of these findings. For instance, Spilimbergo (1999) provides 
evidence against the Dutch-Disease in commodity-rich Chile and South Africa. Papyrakis 
and Gerlagh (2004) argue that abundant natural resources do not lower potential growth but 
rather increase growth in the long run, provided corruption, investment, openness and 
education are controlled for. Indeed, Kronenberg (2004) points out that corruption is the 
main obstacle to growth in a set of transition economies. More generally, Gylfason (2001) 
sets out the preconditions and channels via which natural resources to lead to sluggish long-
term economic growth. He shows that (1) ill-defined property rights, imperfect or missing 
markets and lax legal structures, (2) fighting over resource rents and concentration of 
economic and political power hampering democracy and growth, and (3) the risk of people 
getting stuck in low-skill intensive natural-resource-based industries comprise the hotbed of 
the Dutch Disease. This means that strong institutions and a good educational system 
aimed at upgrading human capital (to enable new and higher value added industries to 
settle in the country) may help to avoid the Dutch Disease. 
            Despite the wealth of literature dealing with the Dutch Disease, there are only a few 
studies that examine specifically the case of transition economies. Those that do so focus 
on specific aspects of the disease. For instance, Kronenberg (2004) and IMF (2007) 
examine long-term growth, and Oomes and Kalcheva (2007), Korhonen and Jurrikkala 
(2007) and Égert and Leonard (2008) study the effects of developments in oil prices on the 
exchange rates of Russia and Kazakhstan. 
                                                 
1 OECD, Economics Department; CESifo; University of Paris X-Nanterre; and the William Davidson Institute. 
Email: balazs.egert@oecd.org. This paper was published in European Economy - Economic Paper no. 327 ‘The 
economic aspects of the energy sector in CIS countries’ of DG ECFIN of the European Commission. The author 
thanks Iikka Korhonen, Wojciech Paczynski and Lúcio Vinhas de Souza for useful comments. The author also 
would like to thank Wojciech Paczynski for help in obtaining data from the World Development Indicators 
database and Glenn Harma for language advice. The views expressed in the paper are those of the author and 
do not represent the official views of the institutions with which he is affiliated. 
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This paper combines the two strands of the literature. We estimate the influence of 
changing commodity prices on the nominal and real exchange rates and analyse the extent 
to which endowment in natural resources influences long-run growth in the countries of the 
former Soviet Union. We test econometrically the channels through which commodity prices 
may be transmitted to the real economy. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the 
mechanism via which the Dutch Disease influences the real economy. Section 3 presents 
some stylised facts. Section 4 studies the relation between oil prices, the exchange rate and 
economic growth, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Dutch Disease 
 
In a country that is rich in natural resources, rising commodity prices can ignite a 
chain of events that may lead to a mighty commodity sector and a deprived manufacturing 
sector. Rising commodity prices encourage investment in the commodity sector and hence 
attract labour from the non-commodity sectors. Wages also increase in the commodity 
sector owing to a labour shortage, which draws labour out of the non-commodity sectors. 
Corden (1984) labels this the resource movement effect, which results in direct 
deindustrialization. Indirect deindustrialization happens if the price of non-tradables relative 
to tradables rises, which draws labour from the manufacturing sector to the non-tradables 
sector. 
There are three theoretical reasons why the relative price of non-tradables may rise. 
The first is related to the resource movement effect: non-tradables prices rise due to excess 
demand for them. The demand for non-tradable goods exceeds the supply, as labour leaves 
the sector.  
The second reason that non-tradables prices rise is the increase in nominal and real 
wages in the commodity sector. If wages tend to equalize across sectors, this leads to 
higher wages in other sectors of the economy. As a consequence of wage increases in the 
non-tradable sector (not supported by productivity gains), the relative price of non-tradable 
goods increases. 
Third, the relative price of non-tradables rises to the event that higher profits and 
wages in the construction sector, and the related tax revenues, are spent on non-tradable 
goods and provided the income elasticity of demand for non-tradables is positive. This third 
effect is also known the spending effect. 
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One consequence of the rise in the relative price of non-tradables due to wage 
spillover from the commodity sector is the appreciation of the real exchange rate. This 
increase in the relative price of non-tradables may overlap with the traditional Balassa-
Samuelson effect due to productivity gains in the non-oil manufacturing sector. If there is 
proportionate wage equalization across sectors and wage increases feed one-to-one into 
non-tradables prices, the commodity boom dominates the Balassa-Samuelson effect if wage 
increases originating in the commodity sector are larger than those in the manufacturing 
sector that are linked to productivity increases. This appreciation – irrespective of whether it 
comes from the commodity sector or from the Balassa-Samuelson effect – will not reduce 
competitiveness so long as the real exchange rate of the manufacturing sector (tradables) 
remains untouched. 
Nonetheless, a real appreciation is possible if the real exchange rate of the 
manufacturing sector appreciates because of higher wages and prices generated by the 
wage equalization process from the commodity sector. The effect of wages on prices may 
be dampened by productivity gains in the manufacturing sector (Balassa-Samuelson effect). 
An additional source of appreciation of the real exchange rate of the manufacturing sector is 
the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate due to the inflow of foreign capital, a spin-off 
from the investment boom in the commodity sector. 
As a consequence of strong appreciation, the manufacturing sector loses 
competitiveness, manifested as a decline in output and employment, and this leads directly 
to deindustrialization (Égert and Leonard, 2008). Table 1. below summarizes the symptoms 
of a construction boom that crowds out the manufacturing sector. 
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Table 1. Symptoms of a commodity boom 
STAGE 
1. Rise in commodity prices 
2. Increase in investment in commodity sector 
3. Resource movement effect 
     - changes in real wages in commodity sector 
     - increase (decrease) in employment in commodity 
(manufacturing, services) 
4. Changes in relative price of non-tradables 
     - Resource movement effect 
     - wage equalization: changes in nominal wages in other sectors 
led by wage rises in commodity sector 
     - spending effect 
     - Balassa-Samuelson effect 
5. Real exchange rate (RER) 
     4.a. Due to relative price of non-tradables – RER based on the 
CPI 
     4.b. Due to relative price of tradables – RER based on the PPI 
     4c. Due to nominal appreciation  
5. Output and employment declines in manufacturing 
 
Implications of Dutch Disease for Growth 
As a consequence of nominal and real appreciation driven by commodity prices, the 
non-commodity manufacturing sector loses competitiveness as manifested in a decline in 
output and employment. It is precisely the disappearance of the non-oil manufacturing 
sector which gives rise to boom-bust economic cycles because, during the downturn phase 
of the commodity price cycle, there is no non-commodity manufacturing to compensate for 
the decline in commodity-production. Hence, commodity price fluctuations are strongly 
reflected in economic fluctuations. This is what we could refer to as the active or long-term 
Dutch Disease: economic growth is damaged in the long run because non-commodity 
manufacturing is hollowed out.  
In the short run, even if non-oil manufacturing activity is maintained, economic 
fluctuations may remain strong due to commodity price fluctuations, simply because of 
swings in commodity-related activities. The lower the share of the commodity-producing 
sector in GDP, the smaller the overall economic fluctuations due to the short-term or passive 
Dutch Disease. 
 
 
 
9 
 
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 380 – Dutch Disease in Former Soviet Union: Witch… 
 
 
 
 
3. Stylised Facts 
 
3.1. Sectoral Resource Reallocation 
 
It is interesting to look into the issue of Dutch Disease because the prices of 
commodities have recorded large increases until recently. Figure 1 indicates that the 
nominal price of crude oil rose from slightly over 10 dollars a barrel in 1998 to almost 60 
dollars in 2006. This sharp increase may have given rise to the Dutch Disease in economies 
that rely heavily on extraction and processing of commodities. Countries of the former Soviet 
Union (FSU countries) may especially qualify as “commodity economies”. According to 
Figure 2, in 2005, fuel exports accounted for more than 30% of total exports from 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. Taking a wider perspective and adding 
metals, unprocessed foods and agricultural products to fuel exports, reveals that FSU 
countries export mostly commodities. The share of commodities in total exports varied 
between 30% (Ukraine) and about 85% (Azerbaijan) in 2005. This observation stands in 
sharp contrast to the considerably lower levels of commodity exports in total exports in other 
parts of the former Soviet bloc. In Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic countries and 
South Eastern Europe, commodities accounted for between 10% (Czech Republic) and 40% 
(Latvia and Lithuania) of total exports in the same year.2
A first indication of a possible Dutch Disease is the change in the composition of 
nominal GDP. Data plotted in Figure 3 shows that the share of the manufacturing sector in 
total GDP declined systematically between 1990 and 2005, while mining gained more 
importance over the same period in FSU countries. Three observations are worthy of note. 
First, the share of manufacturing fell also in non-FSU transition economies. It seems that the 
fall of manufacturing is partly due to the correction of over-industrialisation. Manufacturing 
generally fell in countries where manufacturing accounted for more than 30% of total GDP, 
and it remained stable elsewhere (Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia). 
Second, the share of manufacturing was not strikingly lower in some the FSU countries than 
in the comparator group of non-FSU transition economies. However, in Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia, the share of manufacturing decreased to 
around or even below 10 percent of GDP. Of these countries, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan 
are among the most important fuel exporters. Finally, we can see from the data depicted in 
Figure 3 that in 2005 the share of mining in GDP amounted to more than 10% in some of 
                                                 
2 The large figures for Latvia and Lithuania are due to the fact that much of Russian oil flowed through these 
countries and because Lithuania has an oil refinery. Thus, the high figures are not a result of oil production. 
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the FSU countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Uzbekistan. By contrast, 
mining lost importance dramatically in virtually all non-FSU countries (with the exception of 
Lithuania and Romania). 
Figure 1. Nominal crude oil price, 1990-2006 
crude oil ($)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
 
Source: US DOE/ www.economagic.com and www.ioga.com, average of monthly figures. 
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Figure 2. Share of fuel (left) and all commodities in total exports (right), 1996 and 2005 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from World Development Indicators database. 
Figure 3. Manufacturing (left) and mining (right) as a share of GDP at current prices, 
1990-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from World Development Indicators database. 
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We would have liked to look into the issue of a possible movement of labour into the 
mining sector in the aftermath of oil price increases. But the lack of data on sectoral 
employment that would enable one to distinguish between mining and manufacturing posed 
a constraint on our analysis. Consequently, we are not able to see the extent to which the 
rise of commodity prices resulted in a sectoral reallocation of labour to the mining industry 
from the rest of the economy. 
There are, however, some country studies available to help elucidate the issue. 
Ahrend, de Rosa and Thompson (2007) investigated productivity, wage and output 
developments in Russia’s non-oil manufacturing sectors. In analysing the period from 1995 
to 2003/2004, they took Ukraine as the benchmark for how Russia would have developed 
without relying on its energy resources. The authors show that wages were higher in Russian 
manufacturing than in Ukraine. They argue that the rouble appreciation clearly contributed to 
lower non-oil manufacturing output in Russia as compared to Ukraine and that some sectors 
may have become uncompetitive. Nevertheless, they also claim that these developments did 
not result in a hollowing out of the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, they conclude that 
higher living standards in Russia as compared to Ukraine are certainly due to energy 
production. 
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Ollus and Barisitz (2007) analysed the final stage of the Dutch Disease, namely the 
deindustrialisation of non-energy manufacturing for Russia. They compared the growth rate 
of imports to that of domestic production growth for 13 non-oil manufacturing sectors. They 
argue that imports growing much faster than domestic growth can be considered a sign of 
the slide in competitiveness and the Dutch Disease. They nevertheless acknowledge that 
strong import growth can be caused by something else than the Dutch Disease. For 
instance, high import growth rates coupled with low import penetration rates are not a matter 
of concern. Similarly, imports are not always substitutes for domestic production. Looking at 
the period between 2002 and 2006, they find strong import growth rates in a number of 
sectors such as leather, leather products and shoes, textiles and textile products, machinery 
and equipment, and electrical, electronic and optical equipment. They also show that trends 
are worrying in other sectors as well. The two sectors not much affected are mining and 
quarrying and food production. The authors argue that the high level of tariffs explains the 
good performance of food production. 
Égert and Leonard (2008) report less worrying results for Kazakhstan. They use 
highly disaggregated data to trace the transmission chains of the Dutch Disease. For the 
period from 1998 to 2005, they do not find  robust evidence that oil price increases 
substantially affected investment and wages in non-oil manufacturing and relative prices in 
the economy. Their figures suggest that productivity gains in manufacturing largely 
compensated wage increases over the period studied. Furthermore, they observe little 
spillover from oil prices to the non-oil prices of the producer price index. Finally, they show 
that over the same period the real exchange rate of the non-oil tradable sector did not 
appreciate as a result of oil price increases. 
 
3.2. Resource Movement, Spending Effect and Relative Prices 
 
The next chance to catch sight of the elusive Dutch Disease is presented by the 
study of the impact of the resource movement and spending effects on the relative price of 
non-tradable goods to that of tradable goods. We used two broad measures of relative 
prices: the ratio of overall CPI to food prices (as a proxy for goods prices) and the ratio of 
overall CPI to the wholesale price index. While these measures are of course not perfect 
(see e.g. Égert, Lommatzsch and Lahrèche-Révil, 2006), they allow us to compare broad 
developments in a relatively large number of countries. 
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Figure 4 plots average changes in the CPI-PPI ratio and evidence that relative prices 
declined substantially in the FSU countries for which data are available after 1997.3 Relative 
prices increased more or declined much less in non-FSU countries during the same period. 
The annual data series (not plotted in the paper) tell the same story, implying that it is hard 
to identify – at least when applying eyeball econometrics - any correlation between oil prices 
and the relative price of non-tradable goods and casting doubt on the functioning of the 
resource movement and spending effects. 
Let us now turn to the real exchange rate. As figure 5 shows, while the real 
exchange rate calculated on the basis of the CPI and vis-à-vis the dollar appreciated to 
some extent during the post Russian crisis period, this appreciation is apparently in part a 
correction of the large depreciation during and just after the Russian crisis. Furthermore, the 
extent of this appreciation has nothing to do with the sizeable appreciation that occurred 
during the run-up to the Russian crisis. Perhaps, with the exception of Azerbaijan, the real 
exchange rate of the FSU countries remained fairly flat after 2001. 
Finally, coming to real GDP growth, Figure 6 shows that FSU countries recorded a 
much sharper drop in real GDP in the early phase of economic transition, but then they 
exhibited considerably stronger economic growth rates than their non-FSU counterparts, 
except for the three Baltic tigers. 
 
Figure 4. Relative price of non-tradables, 1990-2006 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from World Development Indicators database. Relative price is 
measured as CPI-PPI ratio. 
                                                 
3 The data are from World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. 
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Figure 5. CPI-based real exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar, 1993-2006, annual 
changes 
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              Source: Author’s calculations based on data from World Development Indicators database.  
 
 
Figure 6. Real GDP growth, 1992-2006 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from World Development Indicators database. 
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4. Empirical Tests of Dutch Disease 
 
There are two obvious ways to empirically test for the existence of Dutch Disease. 
The first relates to the link between developments in nominal and real exchange rates 
originating from oil prices. The second way is to look at the growth effects of resource 
abundance and oil prices. We elaborate on these two possibilities in this section. 
 
4.1. Commodity Prices and the Exchange Rate 
 
The literature on exchange rate economics provides two straightforward ways to get 
a grasp on the effect of commodity prices on the exchange rate. First, commodity prices can 
be incorporated into a standard monetary model of the exchange rate. Second, real 
commodity prices are a commonly used indicator of terms-of-trade shocks and are used in 
real exchange rate models. Let us briefly review how commodity prices can be treated in the 
two approaches. 
4.1.1. Monetary Model and Commodity Prices 
The standard monetary model relies on a two-country framework in which each 
country produces one (tradable) good, has its own money and bond, which are perfectly 
substitutable. Standard money demand functions for the domestic and foreign economies 
are the first building block of a model that, combined with the assumptions of purchasing 
power parity (PPP) for the whole economy ( ) and demand equalling supply on 
the money market ( ), helps us express the nominal exchange rate as a 
function of money supply, income and the interest differential between the home and foreign 
economies: 
*
ttt ppe −=
**, St
D
t
S
t
D
t mmmm ==
)()( *2
*
1
*
ttttttt iiyymme −+−−−= ββ      (1) 
where is the nominal exchange rate, expressed in units of domestic currency per one unit 
of foreign currency
te
 4,  and  are money supply and real income and  denotes the 
interest rate. The interest rate can stand for the returns on financial assets included in the 
definition of money, i.e. the own rate of money ( ). But it can also stands for the 
opportunity costs holding liquid assets, i.e. the return on financial assets not included in the 
tm ty ti
OWN
ti
                                                 
4 This implies that an increase (decrease) in the exchange rate is a depreciation (appreciation) of the domestic 
currency vis-à-vis the foreign currency. 
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definition of the monetary aggregate ( ). If a narrow definition of money is used, is 
zero and  can be either the short or long-term interest rate. If one considers a broader 
definition of money, short-term interest rates capture , while long-term interest rates are 
more appropriate for . 
OUT
ti
OWN
ti
OUT
ti
OWN
ti
OUT
ti
Small letters denote - here and in the rest of the paper - log-transformed variables, 
except for interest rates. The asterisk refers to the foreign economy. 
Equation (1) states that a relative increase in money supply yields a real 
depreciation, while a rise in relative real income causes a real appreciation. Regarding the 
effects of the interest rate, the own rate of money, i.e. the short-term interest rate is 
expected to bring about a real appreciation because an increase in  would cause 
economic agents to increase there real money balances and thus would result in a nominal 
appreciation via the PPP channel. At the same time, a rise in the long-term rate differential 
is related to a depreciation of the currency, which accords with the uncovered interest parity 
condition, because a rise in  reduces money demand and leads to a nominal 
depreciation. 
OWN
ti
OWN
ti
The standard monetary model can be tailored to capture the features of commodity 
exporting countries. El Shazy (1989) introduces a wealth term in the money demand 
function of the net oil exporting domestic economy. The wealth term is related to the real 
value of oil reserves and is expressed as the ratio of the price of oil exports to foreign 
tradable prices ( ) times the expected oil reserves ( ). Commodity 
prices can be added to the money demand function using a similar line of reasoning. 
Equation (2) below shows the modified monetary model that included real commodity prices: 
*
t
OIL
t
OIL
t pprp −= OILtres
COM
tttttttt rpiiyymme 4
*
2
*
1
* )()( βββ −+−+−−−=     (2) 
One strong assumption of the standard monetary model is that PPP holds for the 
economy as a whole, i.e. the real exchange rate is stable over time. However, according to 
the well-known Balassa-Samuelson effect, the real exchange rate may appreciate 
systematically because of the impact of productivity gains in the tradable sector on the 
relative price of non-tradables. It can be easily shown that the productivity differential 
between home and foreign economies can be incorporate into the monetary model as 
follows: 
))())((1()()( ***2
*
1
* NT
t
T
t
NT
t
T
t
OUT
t
OUT
tttttt aaaaiiyymme −−−−−−+−−−= φββ   (3) 
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where  and  are productivity in the non-tradable and tradable sectors (see e.g. 
Crespo-Cuaresma, Fidrmuc and MacDonald, 2005). It is now widely acknowledged in the 
literature that the Balassa-Samuelson effect is of little relevance for the transition economies 
of Central and Eastern Europe and that the observed real appreciation is mainly due to 
trend appreciation of the tradable sector’s real exchange rate due to a quality effect (see 
e.g. Égert, Halpern and MacDonald, 2006). This upward trend in goods prices in the home 
country can be captured by the introduction of a trend term in the money demand function of 
the home economy, which gives us the modified exchange rate equation as in equation (4) 
NT
ta
T
ta
trendiiyymme ttttttt 4
*
2
*
1
* )()( βββ −−+−−−=     (4) 
4.1.2. Real Exchange Rate and Commodity Prices 
The risk-adjusted real interest parity relationship, which has been used extensively in 
the literature (see e.g. Faruqee, 1995; MacDonald, 1998a,b), provides a convenient 
framework for modelling the relationship between the real exchange rate and economic 
fundamentals. The real interest parity condition states that the real exchange rate expected 
one period ahead is a function of the expected real interest rate and a the time-varying risk 
premium. If the expected real exchange rate is the outcome of the expected values of the 
economic fundamentals, the observed real exchange rate is determined by the vector of 
long-run fundamentals assuming rational expectations. 
Real commodity prices are commonly included in real exchange rate models to 
capture terms-of-trade fluctuations. In net commodity exporting countries, an increase in 
commodity prices relative to the price of other (imported) goods represents a positive terms-
of-trade shock and thus leads to real appreciation, whereas higher commodity prices 
generate a negative terms-of-trade shock in net commodity importing countries and causes 
the real exchange rate to depreciate. 
Of the many other potential fundamentals, the productivity variable is by far the most 
robust for most empirical work. Productivity affects the real exchange rate via two channels. 
The first is the Balassa-Samuelson effect, which transits through the relative price of non-
tradables versus tradables. The second channel concerns the real exchange rate of the 
tradables sector. According to New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) models, 
productivity gains in the tradables sector causes the real exchange rate of that sector to 
depreciate through the terms-of-trade channel (see e.g. MacDonald and Ricci, 2002 and 
Benigno and Thoenissen, 2003). Whether or not the real exchange rate of the whole 
economy depreciates or appreciates in the aftermath of an increase in productivity of the 
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tradables sector depends on whether the depreciation of the open sector’s real exchange 
rate is outweighed by the real appreciation induced by the Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
By contrast, productivity gains in tradables can cause a real appreciation of the 
tradable sector’s exchange rate due to quality effects on both on the production and 
consumption side. On the one hand, the catching-up process entails the production of goods 
and services of improved quality. On the other hand, private households grow richer and 
upgrade the quality of their consumption basket, which can be viewed as an extension of 
Engel’s law. To the extent that these changes occur rapidly, statistical offices may find it 
difficult to filter out all quality effects from the inflation rates. As a result, quality effects will, 
to varying degrees, show up in inflation rates (Égert, Lommatzsch and Lahrèche, 2006 and, 
for formal modelling, Bruha and Podpiera, 2007). Égert, Lommatzsch and Lahrèche (2006) 
provide ample empirical evidence on how differently productivity gains impact the real 
exchange rate of mature OECD economies and catching-up transition economies. 
It has been argued recently that remittances may play an important role in real 
exchange rate movements in developing countries. Lopez, Molina and Bussolo (2007) argue 
that workers’ remittances can influence the exchange rate because they are reflected in 
capital inflows. They identify three channels through which remittances may impact the 
exchange: via net foreign effects, via demand effects on services if remittances are spent on 
consumption rather than on investment and via economic growth. Our country sample 
includes a number of countries where remittances are fairly large. It is against this 
background that we also use remittances as an explanatory variable. 
Figure 7. Remittances as a share of GDP, 2000-2006 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from World Development Indicators database. 
19 
 
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 380 – Dutch Disease in Former Soviet Union: Witch… 
 
 
 
4.1.3. Testable equations 
We estimate three variants of the monetary model sketched above: 
1. Standard monetary model augmented with commodity prices 
2. Balassa-Samuelson monetary model augmented with commodity prices 
3. Monetary model augmented with a trend and commodity prices 
We do not include the interest rate variable in the monetary model because interest rates 
obviously cannot play a role due to capital controls in the FSU countries. 
For the real exchange rate, we estimate a model for the CPI-based real exchange 
rate that includes GDP per capita vis-à-vis the foreign benchmark and real commodity 
prices. The choice of the per-capita income variable is motivated by the fact that sectoral 
productivity figures that allow for separation of commodity and non-commodity productivity 
are not available for our set of countries. It needs to be emphasized that the per-capita 
income variable not only captures the Balasssa-Samuelson effect but is also a proxy for 
factors driving the appreciation of the tradables sector’s real exchange rate. Furthermore, 
this variable can also reflect demand-side effects. Finally, remittances as a share of GDP 
will be also used in the estimations. As result, the following reduced-form equations are 
estimated for the real exchange rate: 
1. Real exchange rate, GDP per capita and real oil prices 
2. Real exchange rate, remittances and real oil prices 
3. Real exchange rate, GDP per capita, remittances and real oil prices 
4.1.4. Estimation results 
We first use standard panel unit root tests to analyse the time series properties of our 
data.5 The Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) test, which imposes homogenous mean reversion on the 
sample, and the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test, which allows for country specific mean 
reversion, suggest that most of the series used with the nominal and real exchange rate 
models are stationary. The nominal and real exchange rate series also turn out to be 
stationary in levels. By contrast, both tests indicate that the nominal and real oil price series 
have a unit root for both the FSU panel and the non-FSU panel. Additionally, there is some 
mixed evidence for some of the other explanatory variables, such as GDP per capita, real 
GDP and monetary aggregates. This leads us to use log-differenced series because 
differencing the data transforms the independent variable of interest (oil prices) into a 
                                                 
5 The following data series are calculated as the ratio of the domestic variable to the foreign benchmark (USA or 
euro area): monetary aggregates, real GDP growth and GDP per capita (in PPS). 
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stationary series. In this way we can obtain economically meaningful coefficients by 
regressing changes in the exchange rate on changes in the price of oil. 
Tables 2 and 3 report estimation results obtained for the dollar and euro exchange 
rates. We carried out the estimation for the whole period, from 1991 to 2006. Because there 
is an obvious break in the exchange rate series of the FSU countries around the time of the 
Russian crisis (see Figure 5), we split the sample in two subsamples. Only results obtained 
for the sub-period from 1999 to 2006 are reported in Tables 2 and 3, as the results for the 
whole period and the first sub-samples do not seem to provide any additional information 
regarding exchange rate movements in the FSU countries. 
We first carried out a simple bivariate regression between the nominal exchange rate 
and nominal oil prices on the one hand, and the real exchange rate and the real price of oil 
(deflated by US CPI). The striking finding is that there seems to be no statistical relationship 
between changes in the exchange rate and changes in oil prices. The fixed-effect OLS 
estimations for the monetary model and variants of the real exchange rate model do not 
alter this conclusion.  
The lack of statistical relationship between oil prices and the exchange rate may be 
due to several factors. First, our sample period might be too short to detect such a 
relationship. Second, countries may be affected differently, so that those that are influenced 
less by oil prices dominated those for which oil prices would matter for exchange rate 
movements. Finally, the oil price may feed into an appreciation with some lag. We check this 
latter possibility by employing lagged nominal and real oil prices. The bivariate relationships 
suggest that changes in the nominal oil price influence the nominal exchange rate of FSU 
countries against the dollar after a lag of one or two years. For the euro exchange rates, 
even the contemporaneous coefficient becomes significant. Nevertheless, once we account 
for the determinants of the monetary model, only the nominal oil price lagged by one year 
remains statistically significant for the dollar exchange rate. The effects of oil prices be 
virtually unchanged by the inclusion of the monetary variables.  
We observe a similar pattern for real oil prices and the real exchange rate: the real 
price of oil induces a real appreciation after a lag of one or two years. The inclusion of the 
other control variables does not change the results.6
                                                 
6 Regarding the monetary model, its standard version appears to produce the expected results for the 
FSU countries against the US dollar and for the non-FSU countries against the US dollar and euro: 
relative real GDP growth causes the nominal exchange rate to appreciate while relative money supply 
generates a currency depreciation. Relative GDP per capita and the time trend are also found to lead to 
nominal appreciation. This result is less robust, partly because the issue of mutli-collinearity may arise 
between the relative GDP per capita and relative real GDP variables. The adjusted R-square for the 
monetary model suggests that about a half of the variation in the nominal exchange rate can be 
explained by the explanatory variables. 
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Table 2. Monetary model 
 
  vis-à-vis US dollar vis-à-vis euro 
 FSU-10 – 1999-2006 
OIL_NOM 0.321  0.084 -0.005 0.094 0.193  -0.094 -0.107 -0.078 
REAL_GDP  -2.008* -1.958** -1.279** -0.279  -1.233 -1.272 -1.081 -0.116 
M2  0.722*** 0.685*** 0.743*** 0.681***  0.667*** 0.721*** 0.731*** 0.688*** 
CAPITA    -1.570**     -0.389  
TREND     -0.062***     -0.043** 
R2 adj 0.16 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.57 0.16 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.45 
No. of country 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
OBS 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
 FSU-10 – 1999-2006 – lagged oil prices 
OIL_NOM -0.183  -0.202 -0.280 0.320 -0.360*  -0.543*** -0.592*** -0.393* 
OIL_NOM(-1)  -0.398***  -0.304*** -0.278*** -0.127 -0.485***  -0.450*** -0.456*** -0.401***
OIL_NOM(-2) -0.343**  -0.217 -0.233 0.211 -0.367***  -0.350*** -0.369*** -0.230 
REAL_GDP   -1.140** -0.690 -0.134   -0.041 0.386 0.239 
M2   0.649*** 0.693*** 0.666***   0.658*** 0.679*** 0.649*** 
CAPITA    -1.115     -0.808  
TREND     -0.067***     -0.019 
R2 adj 0.35  0.47 0.47 0.60 0.48  0.59 0.59 0.59 
No. of country 10  10 10 10 10  10 10 10 
OBS 80  80 80 80 80  80 80 80 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. 
 
 
Table 3. Real exchange rate models 
 
  vis-à-vis US dollar  vis-à-vis euro 
 FSU-10 – 1999- 2006 
OIL_REAL 0.148 0.019 0.131 0.022 0.004 -0.012 0.002 -0.010 
CAPITA  -1.916**  -1.702**  -0.363  -0.296 
REMITTANCES   -0.065*** -0.043***   -0.014 -0.009 
R2 adj -0.05 0.18 0.04 0.21 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 
No. of country 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
OBS 77 77 76 76 77 77 76 76 
 FSU-10 – 1999- 2006 lagged real oil prices 
OIL_REAL -0.143 -0.193* -0.113 -0.170 -0.333*** -0.329*** -0.364*** -0.359*** 
OIL_REAL(-1) -0.256*** -0.205*** -0.245*** -0.203*** -0.350*** -0.355*** -0.359*** -0.361*** 
OIL_REAL(-2) -0.192*** -0.177** -0.158** -0.157** -0.212*** -0.216*** -0.239*** -0.239*** 
CAPITA  -1.187***  -1.060**  0.230  0.130 
REMITTANCES   -0.042** -0.031   0.020 0.018 
R2 adj 0.32 0.39 0.35 0.41 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 
No. of country 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
OBS 77 77 76 76 77 77 76 76 
Notes: *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Turning now to the real exchange rate models, it is noteworthy that relative GDP per capita growth and 
remittances are associated with an appreciation of the dollar real exchange rate of FSU countries. For 
the euro exchange rate, none of the variables are statistically significant. Interestingly, and contrary to 
earlier findings of the literature, the real exchange rate models perform quite poorly for non-FSU 
countries. 
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5. Natural Resources and Economic Growth 
 
5. 1. The Setup 
The next question relates to the impact of resource abundance and commodity 
prices on economic growth. We argued earlier that commodity prices may correlate 
positively with economic growth in the short run (passive Dutch Disease) and that the 
presence of important natural resources could impede economic growth in the longer run 
(active Dutch Disease). 
To probe these matters, we estimate growth equations to determine the extent to which the 
reliance on natural resources influences long-term economic growth. We use several 
proxies: 
- the share of fuel exports in total exports (X_OIL) 
- the share of natural resources (fuel, metal, agricultural products and food) in total 
exports (X_NATRES) 
- the share of the mining industry in total GDP (MINING) 
We incorporate the usual control variables used in the growth literature. While there seems 
to be no consensus on what the usual determinants of long-term growth are (see e.g. 
Durlauf et al, 2004 and Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004), we employ the main factors 
commonly viewed as drivers of economic growth in our benchmark specification: 
- investment-GDP ratio (INV) 
- government consumption-GDP ratio (GOVC) 
- labour force growth rate (LABFOR) 
- openness (ratio of exports + imports of goods and services to GDP, OPEN) 
- human capital measured by educational attainment: total upper secondary 
education enrolment (EDU1), higher education enrolments (gross ratios, percent of 
population aged 19-24) (EDU2) and Public expenditure on education (percent of GDP) 
(EDU3) 
- health of the population in 1990 measured by Public sector expenditure on 
health (percent of GDP) (HEALTH1) and incidence of tuberculosis (new cases per 100000 
population) (HEALTH2) 
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In transition economies, initial conditions are particularly important, especially in the early 
days of transition. We employ the following variables for initial conditions that could impact 
economic growth: 
- level of GDP per capita in 1990 (CAPITA90) 
- human capital in 1992: total upper secondary education enrolment in 1992 
(EDU1_92) and higher education enrolments in 1992 (EDU_92) 
- health of the population in 1990, measured by incidence of tuberculosis 
(HEALTH2_90) 
- foreign debt as a share of GDP in 1993 (FDEBT_93) 
It should be noted that initial conditions can be used as constant terms given that they take 
the same value over time. As a result, only one of them can be included at a time. 
We include another set of variables viewed as crucial for transition and developing 
economies: 
- inflation as a measure of macroeconomic stability (INF) 
- corruption, measured by two indicators: corruption index of Transparency 
International (CORR_TI) in 1999 and corruption index for 2002 published by World Bank (% 
of managers surveyed ranking this as a major constraint) (CORR_WB) 
- additionally, we interact corruption with natural resources. 
- structural indicators reflecting reforms implemented in the corporate and 
banking sectors (INSTIT) 
- remittances as a share of GDP (REMIT) 
We take a long-term perspective and perform cross-sectional regressions using 5-year and 
8-year averages of the dependent and independent variables. We have three observations 
for each country when 5-year averages are used (1992-1996, 1997-2001, 2002-2006) and 
two observations for 8-year averages (1991-1998,1999-2006). 
Our sample contains the FSU countries and transition countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe to ensure sufficient variability in the share of oil production/natural 
resources in GDP. 
While the growth literature usually suggests regressing the growth rate of GDP per capita in 
PPP on the above set of variables, we will also use real GDP growth rates, being an 
indicator of utmost policy interest. 
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5.2. Estimation Results 
 
Table 4a below reports the results of the bivariate relationship between real GDP 
growth (or the growth rate of per capita income in PPS) and the three measures capturing 
natural resource abundance. The amount of oil exports in total exports and the relative size 
of the mining industry turn out to be correlated positively with growth. The relationship is, 
however, not significant when the share of all primary goods (oil, metal, agricultural products 
and foodstuff) in total exports is included. This suggests that positive growth effects are due 
to flourishing oil exports and the mining industry, but not to the other (mainly agricultural) 
sectors. 
The question that arises is whether the relation between oil production and exports 
increased over time, in particular with the observed increase in crude oil prices over the last 
10 years or so. To answer this question, we interacted the three measures at hand with a 
time trend. The results show that the effect of natural resources on economic growth 
increased over time, irrespective whether 5-year or 8-year averages were used. 
Next, we added a set of control variables to the growth equation estimated with fixed 
effect OLS. Table 4b reports the results for GDP per capita growth, which shed light on the 
relation between oil exports and growth. We find a negative relation between oil exports and 
growth. Nonetheless, oil exports interacted with a time trend are found to increase long-term 
growth. Our interpretation of these results is that during the first stage of transition, the 
reliance on oil production did not facilitate economic growth, but it started to contribute to 
growth from the mid-1990s. This is fairly intuitive if we think of the pronounced declines in 
GDP in the major oil producing transition economies during the first half of the 1990s and 
the robust growth these countries have experienced since then, compared to the non-oil 
producing transition economies. 
It is noteworthy that high inflation rates reduce long-term growth, whereas an 
increase in the labour force and higher remittances increase growth for our set of countries. 
The other controls remain statistically insignificant. 
Finally, we used the two measures of corruption (for each of which we have just one 
observation per country) and a number of variables aimed at controlling for initial conditions. 
Because these variables act as country-specific effects, we carried out pooled OLS 
including a constant term. Our previous findings seem to be very robust to the inclusion of 
initial conditions. In fact, the initial conditions and the degree of corruption are unimportant 
for economic growth, at least for our country sample. 
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Table 4a. Growth equations – Bivariate relationships 
 
 REAL GDP GROWTH GROWTH RATE OF GDP PER CAPITA (PPP, USD)
 5-YEAR AVERAGES – 1992- 3006
X_OIL 0.647***   -0.366   0.639***   -0.500*   
X_OIL*@trend    0.239***      0.269***   
X_NATREV  0.1903   0.125   0.082   0.006  
X_NATREV*@trend     0.138***      0.154***  
MINING   1.300***   0.028   1.302***   -0.394 
MINING*@trend      0.453***      0.596*** 
R2 0.31 0.17 0.45 0.54 0.70 0.56 0.31 0.15 0.44 0.60 0.82 0.60
R2 adj -0.09 -0.32 0.12 0.26 0.51 0.27 -0.10 -0.34 0.09 0.35 0.71 0.33 
No. of countries 24 24 21 24 24 21 24 24 21 24 24 21 
OBS 66 66 57 66 66 57 66 66 56 66 66 56 
 8-YEAR AVERAGES – 1991 – 2006
X_OIL 0.814***   0.060   0.914***   -0.222   
X_OIL*trend    0.254**      0.383***   
X_NATREV  0.047   0.031   -0.02   -0.043  
X_NATREV*@trend     0.211***      0.257***  
MINING   1.087**   -0.729   1.098**   -0.389 
MINING*@trrend      1.140**      1.297*** 
R2 0.42 0.14 0.44 0.57 0.81 0.74 0.40 0.10 0.48 0.68 0.94 0.79
R2 adj -0.21 -0.80 -0.26 0.05 0.58 0.37 -0.25 -0.89 -0.17 0.30 0.86 0.51 
No. of countries 24 24 21 24 24 21 24 24 21 24 24 21 
OBS 47 47 39 47 47 39 47 47 39 47 47 39 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
 
 
Table 4b. Growth equations 
 
GROWTH RATE OF GDP PER CAPITA (PPP, USD) 
 
5-YEAR AVERAGES 
1992-2006 
8-YEAR AVERAGES 
1991-2006 
X_OIL -0.463** -0.426** -0.435** -0.509** -0.481** -0.442* 
X_OIL*@TREND 0.137*** 0.135*** 0.123*** 0.269*** 0.269*** 0.253** 
CPI -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009** 
OPEN -0.033 -0.033 -0.055 0.061 0.071 0.069 
GOVC 0.192 0.217 0.169 0.106 0.376 0.207 
INV -0.097 -0.074 -0.084 0.220 0.240 0.197 
INSTIT 2.754 2.197 4.999** -0.635 -0.116 2.924 
LABFOR 1.739** 1.594** 1.361* 0.077 0.131 0.140 
REMIT 0.650*** 0.659*** 0.611*** 0.698** 0.675** 0.679* 
EDU1 0.057   0.222   
EDU2  0.054   0.087  
EDU3   -0.772   0.661 
HEALTH2 0.070 0.060 0.053 0.126** 0.086* 0.093 
R2 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.96 0.96 0.95 
R2 adj 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.81 
No. of countries 22 22 22 22 22 22 
OBS 63 63 61 44 44 43 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
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Table 4c. Growth equations – initial conditions, 5-year averages 
 
GROWTH RATE OF GDP PER CAPITA (PPP, USD) 
X_OIL -0.094* -0.095* -0.110* -0.094* -0.096* -0.092* -0.117** 
X_OIL*@trend 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.127*** 0.117*** 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.125*** 
CPI -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
OPEN 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.001 -0.009 
GOVC -0.314 -0.321 -0.176 -0.247 -0.290 -0.287 -0.262 
INV 0.126 0.115 0.123 0.112 0.135 0.132 0.142 
INSTIT 0.208 0.276 0.244 0.220 0.400 0.350 0.262 
LABFOR 0.095 0.092 0.140 0.357 0.016 0.037 0.134 
REMIT 0.428*** 0.414*** 0.405*** 0.387*** 0.410*** 0.406*** 0.439*** 
EDU1 0.143** 0.164** 0.159** 0.165*** 0.138* 0.154** 0.123* 
HEALTH2 0.015 0.007 0.008 0.036 0.013 0.013 0.017 
CORR_TI?      -0.037  
CORR_WB?       0.826 
INITIAL CONDITIONS 
LOG(CAPITA90) 0.857       
FDEBT_93  -0.008      
HEALTH1_92   -0.456     
HEALTH2_92    -0.087*    
EDU1_92     0.027   
R2 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.74 
R2 adj 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.67 
No. of countries 22 21 22 22 22 22 22 
OBS 63 60 63 63 63 63 63 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
 
Table 4d. Growth equations – initial conditions, 8-year averages 
 
GROWTH RATE OF GDP PER CAPITA (PPP, USD) 
X_OIL -0.097* -0.100* -0.104* -0.100* -0.107* -0.104* -0.115** 
X_OIL*@trend 0.262*** 0.263*** 0.266*** 0.259*** 0.262*** 0.263*** 0.262*** 
CPI -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
OPEN 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.009 0.014 0.013 0.004 
GOVC -0.200 -0.220 -0.193 -0.208 -0.239 -0.227 -0.200 
INV 0.216* 0.218* 0.209* 0.203* 0.215* 0.211* 0.216* 
INSTIT 1.539 1.361 1.388 1.432 1.559 1.440 1.378 
LABFOR -0.247 -0.180 -0.185 -0.101 -0.239 -0.203 -0.115 
REMIT 0.394** 0.421** 0.418** 0.410** 0.413** 0.410** 0.443** 
EDU1 0.157* 0.150* 0.149* 0.150* 0.104 0.153* 0.121 
HEALTH2 0.016 0.021 0.017 0.026 0.017 0.017 0.021 
CORR_TI?      -0.180  
CORR_WB?       0.663 
INITIAL CONDITIONS 
LOG(CAPITA90) -0.818       
FDEBT_93  0.006      
HEALTH1_92   -0.112     
HEALTH2_92    -0.027    
EDU1_92     0.067   
R2 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.78 
R2 adj 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70 
No. of countries 22 21 22 22 22 22 22 
OBS 44 42 44 44 44 44 44 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at  10, 5 and 1% levels. 
?
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6. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this study, we sought to uncover the extent to which countries of the former Soviet 
Union are suffering from the Dutch Disease. The stylised facts showed that some of the 
FSU countries are very dependent on the production and export of primary goods, in 
particular oil products. Despite the importance of oil production, we could not establish the 
presence of resource and spending effects because the relative prices of FSU countries 
declined in the last few years instead of rising, as would be expected in connection with 
Dutch Disease. Nevertheless, the share of manufacturing declined and the importance of 
the mining sector increased recently, along with a surge in real economic growth.  
These are first indications showing that an increase in the price of oil does impact the 
real economies of the FSU countries. Our analysis revealed that an increase in oil prices 
results in an appreciation of the nominal and real exchange rates, against both the dollar 
and the euro. But the pass-through from oil prices to exchange rate does take some time to 
materialise: we found that oil price increases feed into nominal and real appreciation with a 
lag of one or two years. 
Finally, we addressed the question of whether relying excessively on natural 
resources impedes long-term growth or whether it has a positive effect on GDP. Our results 
based on growth regressions using 5-year and 8-year averages indicate that oil exports are 
linked positively with economic growth. Nevertheless, a high share of other primary goods - 
mainly agricultural products - in total exports does not seem to promote growth. Our results 
also showed that oil exports had a negative effect on growth during the first stage of 
economic transition but made a positive contribution in the last years. 
While data problems prevented us from determining whether there is a reallocation 
of labour between sectors due to high oil prices, our results with regard to the exchange rate 
and sources of economic growth are a clear sign of Dutch Disease: oil prices do cause 
nominal and real appreciation in the FSU countries and, to the extent that non-oil 
manufacturing cannot stand the pressure, this will lead to deindustrialisation. Moreover, 
because economic growth is largely driven by oil exports in a number of FSU countries, a 
future decline in oil prices or depletion of oil resources would probably jeopardize future 
GDP growth. 
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